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A New York State of Mind
RECONCILING LEGISLATIVE INCREMENTALISM
WITH SEXUAL ORIENTATION JURISPRUDENCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The process of securing equal rights and protections
under the law for traditionally marginalized groups is never an
easy task. Likewise, securing the passage of anti-
discrimination legislation and advancing progressive civil
rights jurisprudence is difficult to achieve, particularly on the
national level. Where the social and political climate is hostile
to dramatic change, marginalized groups often seek gradual
change through judicial and legislative remedies. It is a
strategy of incrementalism - a process by which they slowly
and methodically seek to secure individual rights and
protections. The gay and lesbian civil rights movement in
particular has adopted both a geographic and substantive
incremental approach. The question is whether this approach
is truly conducive to the movement's goals.
While incrementalism is generally accepted as a viable
approach to securing equal rights, it has been criticized for
essentially kowtowing to the theoretical game of granting
specific rights to certain groups while excluding other groups.'
While this analysis raises important questions about the
viability of incrementalism from a theoretical perspective, a
second analysis of incrementalism might provide even more
insight into the viability of the incremental approach to
© 2004 Ryan E. Mensing. All Rights Reserved.
See James M. Donovan, Baby Steps or One Fell Swoop?: The Incremental
Extension of Rights is not a Defensible Strategy, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (2001).
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securing equal rights for the gay and lesbian community. This
Note will analyze the incremental approach from a geographic
perspective by using New York State as a model of what
incrementalism can and cannot achieve through legislative
action. Incrementalism narrowly constructed along substantive
and geographic lines creates a useful but inconsistent
patchwork of civil rights within the particular state while
simultaneously diluting the impetus for change that accords
with the needs of the minority community on a broader scale.
In order to critique incrementalism in New York State,
the entire gay rights landscape requires analysis. Part II of this
Note defines incrementalism and its applications. Part III then
provides a brief history of the gay rights movement, its
accomplishments in the United States and New York State,
and the current agenda. Part IV analyzes the development of
local gay rights initiatives and the patchwork of legal
protection they create. With these results in mind, Part V
focuses on the federal and state sexual orientation
jurisprudence and how it impacts the everyday lives of gays
and lesbians. Finally, Part VI considers the implications of
incrementalism with regard to the future of the gay rights
movement and ultimately concludes that incrementalism and
broad scale change are interdependent strategies that must be
employed simultaneously to truly advance the goals of the
movement.
II. INCREMENTALISM DEFINED
What is incrementalism? In short, incrementalism
describes the process by which social, political, or legal change
is achieved one step at a time. The objective is to accumulate a
series of small victories that ultimately create large-scale
reform, but not necessarily coordinated legal doctrines or
revolutionary change. It is an alternative to seeking broad
judicial or legislative remedies. As an example, although not
framed in the civil rights context, the environmental movement
has been described as incrementalist, as it has largely
employed gradual remedies to achieve its goals rather than a
direct attack strategy.2 In contrast, the movement to end racial
segregation resulted in a far-reaching judicial remedy in Brown
See generally Lincoln L. Davies, Lessons for an Endangered Movement:
What a Historical Juxtaposition of the Legal Response to Civil Rights and
Environmentalism Has to Teach Environmentalists Today, 31 ENvTL. L. 229 (2001).
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v. Board of Education,3 which abandoned the "separate, but
equal" doctrine established by Plessy v. Ferguson. Certainly,
the effort to end school segregation involved a series of cases
and internal debate within the movement regarding strategy.
However, the legal strategy ultimately focused on attacking the
"separate, but equal doctrine" directly, which resulted in the
ground-breaking decision.! Although traditionally hailed as a
breakthrough, there is considerable debate about whether the
decision actually secured the victory that history has granted
it.' In order to give the ruling effect, courts instituted busing
programs that were designed to create equal educational
opportunities. However, rather than advancing principles of
equal opportunity, the forced busing did little more than
establish racial balance within the schools while the
discrepancy in opportunity remained relatively constant." In
essence, the problem was greater than any court's ability to
solve it in one fell swoop. In light of the challenges presented
by radical attempts at change, modern civil rights movements
have focused their efforts on what is perceived to be the more
pragmatic approach - incrementalism.
On its face, incrementalism might appear as nothing
more than a piecemeal approach to inducing change where the
issues are complex and controversial. However, incrementalism
is more than mere strategy. In fact, incrementalism springs
from a philosophy of tradition, conservatism, and stare decisis.
In the late eighteenth century, Edmund Burke introduced a
philosophy that was the precursor to contemporary
incrementalism.' For Burke and adherents to his views,
"tradition has a place in constitutional interpretation simply
because it is the past."" The authoritative force of tradition is
nothing short of inherent and direct." With regard to
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5 See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
6 See Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and
Classical-Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CAL.
L. REV. 787, 795 (1994).
7 CLINT BOLICK, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A CIVIL RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR
AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY 103-06 (1990).
8 Id. at 104.
9 See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN
FRANCE (Thomas H.D. Mahnoey ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1955) (1790).
Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 212 (1993).
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constitutional interpretation, incrementalists argue that
current judgments about the role of government under the
Constitution must conform to societal traditions."2 Rather than
questioning the past, incrementalism suggests "blind
obedience" to the past. 3 Although those who advance the
incremental approach might not perceive the strategy or
themselves as traditionalists or conservatives, the incremental
approach is indeed rooted in the recognition that the past does
dictate the future and, accordingly, should impact expectations.
The incremental strategy is not about redefining the issues.
Rather, it is about working within conventional frameworks
and modifying them only when absolutely necessary.
The incremental strategy can be employed on an issue-
by-issue basis or on a regional basis. For example, the
movement to establish a broad principle of racial equality by
ending racial segregation in public schools began with
incremental litigation challenges on a state-by-state basis with
the ultimate goal of achieving national results through the U.S.
Supreme Court. The movement to secure equal rights for the
gay and lesbian community has similarly taken a state-by-state
approach. However, the gay rights movement has broken the
incremental strategy down even further by developing an
issue-by-issue strategy within the fifty states. Whereas the
movement to end school segregation had one singular goal
operating in targeted states, the gay civil rights movement has
multiple goals in multiple states, thus creating a lack of
coherence and continuity among and within the states. The
fundamental question is whether this strategy coupled with
isolated victories truly and adequately advances the interests
of gays and lesbians. With this question in mind, the following
section examines the history of the gay rights movement in
order to place the current issues in broader context.
III. THE CURRENT STRUGGLE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. The Movement for National Reform
The birth of the modern gay rights movement is said to
have occurred on June 27, 1969 at the Stonewall Riots in New
12 Id.
13 Id.
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York City.14 After years of police raids on gay bars, the patrons
at the Stonewall fought back and continued fighting for several
days thereafter." Following the riot, gays and lesbians began to
mobilize with a new sense of pride, collective identity, and a
determination to organize to attain basic civil rights."6 In the
early 1970s, gay activists demanded political attention for their
concerns in ways similar to advocates of the black civil rights,
antiwar, and women's movements. 7 Although largely successful
in attaining the attention and support of sympathetic leaders
in Congress in the 1970s, the gay and lesbian movement was
unable to persuade Congress to pass legislation that would
provide protection against anti-gay discrimination." Similar
legislation was introduced through the 1980s and 1990s, but
anti-gay discrimination legislation did not make it to the floor
for a vote of either the House or the Senate until 1996, when
narrowly drawn anti-gay employment discrimination
legislation was defeated in the Senate. 9 In fact, the only
successful action ever taken by Congress remotely related to
gay and lesbian civil rights came in the form of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), which actually operates to further
marginalize gays and lesbians by allowing states to deny
recognition of same-sex unions established in other
jurisdictions."
14 See generally Kenneth Sherrill, The Youth of the Movement: Gay Activists
in 1972-1973, in GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: PUBLIC POLICY,
PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 269, 272 (Ellen D.B. Riggle & Barry
L. Tadlock eds., 1999).
15 Id.
16 Id.
" Donald P. Haider-Markel, Creating Change - Holding the Line: Agenda
Setting on Lesbian and Gay Issues at the National Level, in GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION 242, 248-49 (Ellen D.B. Riggle & Barry L. Tadlock eds., 1999).
18 Id. In May of 1974, Representatives Bella Abzug and Edward Koch, both
Democrats from New York, introduced legislation that would revise the 1964 Civil
Rights Act to include sexual orientation, but the bill failed in committee. Id.
Representative Abzug reintroduced the bill in 1975, but again it failed to move. Id.
19 Id.
20 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). The Defense of Marriage Act states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws
of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising
from such relationship.
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B. The Movement for Reform in the State of New York:
SONDA and Beyond
Although considered the birthplace of the gay and
lesbian civil rights movement, New York State has not been
overwhelmingly responsive to the civil rights of gays and
lesbians. In 1971, legislation was first introduced that would
bar discrimination based on sexual orientation in the areas of
employment, housing, public accommodations, education, and
credit. Since then, the Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination
Act (SONDA) was repeatedly passed by the Assembly, but was
never put to a vote in the Senate. After thirty-one years, there
were indications that both the Assembly and the Senate would
vote on SONDA and that Governor George Pataki would sign
the bill during the 2002 legislative session. However, while
Governor Pataki on two occasions publicly pledged his support
for SONDA, he failed to follow through as the legislative
session came to a close and election year politics came to the
fore.2 Some believe that Pataki backed down from his promise
out of fear that he would lose the support of the Conservative
Party in his reelection bid." When the state legislature went
into recess, it appeared quite likely that SONDA would again
be shelved for the thirty-second time in as many years. In a
surprise move, however, State Senator Joseph Bruno
announced that he would send SONDA to the floor of the
Senate for a vote during a special December 2002 legislative
session.' The move came just days before the Empire State
Pride Agenda (ESPA), New York State's largest gay rights
organization, was to make its gubernatorial endorsement.
Indeed, ESPA announced its endorsement of Governor Pataki's
reelection bid only days later. Regardless of the political
motivation for either putting the legislation aside or putting it
" On October 4, 2001 at the Empire State Pride Agenda's Annual Fall
Dinner, Governor Pataki promised to do "everything in [his] power" to pass SONDA.
See Governor George E. Pataki, Remarks at Empire State Pride Agenda Tenth Annual
Fall Dinner (Oct. 4, 2001), at http://www.prideagenda.org/sonda/patakiremarks.pdf.
Governor Pataki reiterated his support on January 9, 2002 while giving the State of
the State Address. See Governor George E. Pataki, State of the State Address
(September 20, 2003), at http://www.prideagenda.org/sonda/patakistateof-
stateremarks.html.
22 See generally NY1 News, Pataki Blasted for Inaction on Anti-
Discrimination Law for Gays, at http://www.nyl.com/ny/Search/SubTopic/
index.html?&contentintid=22621&search-result=1 (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
James C. McKinley, Jr., New York Bill on Gay Rights is Set for Vote, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 23, 2002, at Al.
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back on the agenda, the fact remained that as of November
2002 New York had failed to join the list of twelve other states
that had passed legislation protecting gays and lesbians
against discrimination. 4
Throughout the thirty-two year struggle to secure broad
anti-gay discrimination legislation in New York State, the gay
and lesbian movement successfully achieved incremental
victories in a number of smaller and more specific contexts. For
instance, in 1983, Governor Mario Cuomo issued an executive
order that banned allotting public employee benefits on the
basis of sexual orientation." In 1996, Governor Pataki reissued
the executive order, which remains in effect today.26 However,
Governor Pataki issued a subsequent order making it clear
that although New York would not discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation as an employer, the state would continue to
grant armed forces recruiters access to public college campuses
despite the ban on homosexuals in the military." Nevertheless,
the state continued to make some progress on gay and lesbian
issues when it included sexual orientation in the language of
the Hate Crimes Act of 2000. The same year, consensual
sodomy was removed from the penal law as part of the Sexual
Assault Reform Act of 2000.9 However, the legislature's
removal of consensual sodomy from the penal law came ten
24 The twelve states that provided anti-gay discrimination protection at the
time were: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
Washington, D.C. has also enacted similar non-discrimination laws. Empire State
Pride Agenda, SONDA: Answers to Common Questions, at
http://www.prideagenda.org/sondalfaq.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
25 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4.28 (1983).
26 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.33 (1996).
27 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.34 (1996).
28 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.00 (Consol. 2004).
The legislature finds and determines as follows: criminal acts involving
violence, intimidation and destruction of property based upon bias and
prejudice have become more prevalent in New York State in recent years.
The intolerable truth is that in these crimes, commonly and justly referred to
as "hate crimes", victims are intentionally selected, in whole or in part,
because of their race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion,
religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation.. .Current law does not
adequately recognize the harm to public order and individual safety that hate
crimes cause. Therefore, our laws must be strengthened to provide clear
recognition of the gravity of hate crimes and the compelling importance of
preventing their recurrence.
Accordingly, the legislature finds and declares that hate crimes should be
prosecuted and punished with appropriate severity.
Id.
29 2000 N.Y. Laws Ch. 1 (S. 8238, A. 11538).
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years after the New York State Court of Appeals struck down
the law as violative of both the right to privacy and equal
protection principles, making it largely a pro forma gesture.'
New York State's history illustrates the difficulty
confronting the gay and lesbian community's efforts to
incrementally secure rights in state legislatures. The gay rights
movement in New York State has achieved a fair amount of
success in the legislative arena in recent years, but the
progress has been slow and counterbalanced by efforts to
maintain the marginalized status of the gay and lesbian
community. For example, anti-gay marriage legislation has
been introduced for five consecutive years in either the
Assembly, Senate, or both." Meanwhile, the legislature
repeatedly fails to agree on how to best protect students from
sexual orientation harassment. The Assembly passed the
Dignity for All Students Act in 2002, while the Senate chose
instead to pass the watered-down Schools as Safe Harbors Act,
which fails to truly deal with the issue of harassment of gay
students.32 The Senate and Assembly revisited the issue again
in 2003, but again failed to resolve it. 3 Although sometimes
hailed as symbolizing a breakthrough era for the gay and
lesbian community in New York State, recent legislative
sessions suggest a continued resistance to dealing with the
issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation, as well as a
resistance to dealing with the other needs of the gay and
lesbian community.
30 People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980).
31 Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, State-by-State: New York
State Law, at http://www.lambdalegal.orgcgi-bin/iowa/states/record?record=32 (last
visited Apr. 10, 2004).
32 The Dignity for All Students Act, S. 1925, A. 1118, 226th Sess. (N.Y. 2003),
would create safe, harassment-free school environments for all students, regardless of
their actual or perceived race, national origin, ethnic group, religion, gender, gender
identity, disability or sexual orientation. See Empire State Pride Agenda, Dignity for
All Students Act, at http://www.prideagenda.orgbriefingpackets/dignity/dignity.html
(last visited Apr. 26, 2004). The Schools as Safe Harbors Act, S. 4023, 226th Sess. (N.Y.
2003), does contain a definition of bullying that delineates categories (such as race,
disability, gender, sexual orientation and so forth), but it does not include specific
language on gender identity and expression. It also does not provide protections
against discrimination, prohibit harassment of students by school staff or provide for
specific teacher training. See Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, 2002
Legislative Wrap-up: Advances Overshadowed by No Resolution on Gay Rights Bill
(June 28, 2002), available at http://www.prideagenda.org/pressreleasespr-6-28-
02.html.
. Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, New York's Statewide Gay
Rights Group Urges Lawmakers to Finish Work on Safe Schools Legislation (July 29,
2003), available at http://www.prideagenda.org/pressreleases/pr-07-29-03.html.
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C. SONDA Reborn
After Governor Pataki handily won reelection to a third
term in November 2002, SONDA once again emerged as a
viable piece of legislation. As promised, Senator Bruno called
back the Senate for a special session to vote on SONDA and
several other holdover bills from the previous legislative
session. On December 17, 2002, thirty-one years after the first
gay rights bill was introduced in Albany, the New York State
Senate passed the Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act
by a vote of thirty-four to twenty-six, and Governor Pataki
signed the bill into law, thereby extending civil rights
protections to gays and lesbians in New York State effective
January 17, 2003.' The practical effect of SONDA's passage
was to add "sexual orientation" to New York State's already
existing civil rights law:
1. All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled
to the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision
thereof.
2. No person shall, because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex,
marital status, sexual orientation or disability, as such term is
defined in section two hundred ninety-two of the executive law, be
subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any
harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the
exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or
institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state. 5
Under the amended civil rights law, no state or private
institutional actor can discriminate against a person on the
basis of sexual orientation in housing, employment, credit, or
public accommodations.
Although the passage of SONDA was overdue, it does
signal some degree of progress for gay and lesbian civil rights
in New York State and theoretically indicates an atmosphere of
responsiveness and opportunity. At first glance, the inclusion of
sexual orientation in any statute providing for equal protection
of the laws is a significant achievement. Together with the
legislative statement describing a history of discrimination and
prejudice against gays and lesbians,"6 this inclusion creates a
34 Shaila K. Dewan, Pataki Signs Law Protecting Rights of Gays, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2002, at Al.
35 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS § 40-c (Consol. 2003) (emphasis added).
36 The legislature found that:
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possibility that gays and lesbians could be considered a "quasi-
suspect class" entitled to a more demanding level of scrutiny in
equal protection challenges to state statutes that operate
against the interests of that community. Under certain
circumstances, the New York State Constitution affords the
individual greater rights than those provided by its federal
counterpart.' However, the wording of the state Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause39 suggests that it is no broader in
coverage than its federal prototype.4 0 Further, the history of
this provision shows that it was not adopted by any perceived
inadequacy in the Supreme Court's delineation of the right."
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to apply heightened
scrutiny in the context of discrimination against homosexuals,
one could reasonably argue that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is analogous to discrimination on the basis
of race or sex and therefore should be tested by either the strict
scrutiny applicable to racial classifications or the mid-level
[M]any residents of this state have encountered prejudice on account of their
sexual orientation, and that this prejudice has severely limited or actually
prevented access to employment, housing and other basic necessities of life,
leading to deprivation and suffering. The legislature further recognizes that
this prejudice has fostered a general climate of hostility and distrust, leading
in some instances to physical violence against those perceived to be
homosexual or bisexual.
Editor's Notes, § 1, N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS § 40-c (Consol. 2003).
3' By invoking heightened scrutiny, the Court recognizes, and compels lower
courts to recognize, that a group may well be the target of the sort of prejudiced,
thoughtless, or stereotyped action that offends principles of equality found in the
Fourteenth Amendment. "Where classifications based on a particular characteristic
have [prejudiced groups] in the past, and the threat that they may do so remains,
heightened scrutiny is appropriate." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 472 (1985). For example, "rather than resting on meaningful
considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in
different ways very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men
and women." Id. at 441. "A gender classification fails unless it is substantially related
to a sufficiently important governmental interest." Id. An even higher standard of
strict scrutiny applies when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin. Id.
at 440. These factors are "so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy - a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as
others." Id. "For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon
rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be
sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest."
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. Rational basis review is appropriate in the absence of any
such class, so that the general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will
be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. Id.
Esler v. Walters, 56 N.Y.2d 306, 313-14, 437 N.E.2d 1090, 1094-95 (1982).
39 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
40 Esler v. Walters, 56 N.Y.2d at 313-14, 437 N.E.2d at 1094-95.
41 Id.
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scrutiny applicable to classifications based on sex.42 This is a
highly plausible argument based on the legislative history, and
it has attracted some favorable attention from lower courts in a
variety of contexts.
Despite the progress suggested by the inclusion of
sexual orientation in New York's civil rights law, the
circumstances surrounding its passage portend trouble afoot.
Accompanying the text of the amendment is an additional
statement of the legislature's intent, which can only be viewed
as alarming. The legislature closed its comments by stating
that "[n]othing in this legislation should be construed to create,
add, alter or abolish any right to marry that may exist under
the [Clonstitution of the United States, or this state and/or the
laws of this state."" Considering the gay and lesbian
community's goal of obtaining equal relationship recognition
rights, by including such language the legislature foreclosed
any opportunity that the statute could be construed to advance
any interests beyond the prohibition of anti-gay discrimination.
In the midst of a civil rights victory, gays and lesbians were
once again reminded of their subordinate status in New York
and the distance yet to travel towards true equality.
D. September 11: Tragedy as an Impetus for Change?
Supporters of the incremental strategy to securing gay
rights in New York State may point to the legislature's
response to the events of September 11, 2001, particularly
regarding the incorporation of same-sex partners into survivor
benefits. However, these advances also foreshadow the
ultimate challenge of local incrementalism. The power to truly
advance the interests of gays and lesbians in same-sex
relationships ultimately rests with the state government.
Moreover, the "special" nature of these provisions underscores
their exceptional character.
New York State acknowledged the interests of gay and
lesbian partners in several victim recovery programs related to
the events of September 11, 2001. Governor Pataki, Attorney
General Elliot Spitzer, Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, and
State Senate Majority Leader Bruno introduced the September
42 Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1
(1994).
43 Id.
44 N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS § 40-c (Consol. 2003).
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11th Victims and Families Relief Act, and the bill became law
on May 21, 2002."° It included language in the legislative intent
section of the bill specifying that the legislature desired to
make domestic partners eligible for federal fund awards." This
provision was included to provide Special Master Kenneth
Feinberg an additional basis in state law to award federal fund
compensation to gay partners of 9/11 victims. Other related
legislation included an amendment to the state's worker's
compensation law to provide domestic partners of 9/11 victims,
which includes same-sex partners of 9/11 victims, the same
death benefits that spouses receive under the state's worker's
compensation law. 7 Additionally, the legislature made domestic
partners of 9/11 victims and their children eligible for the
state's World Trade Center Memorial Scholarship Program.
These measures raise the question of whether
legislators have truly changed their thinking on same-sex
relationships or whether legislators were conscious of the
political ramifications of denying recovery to any victim of the
attacks. The text describing the legislature's intent in passing
SONDA suggests that legislators have not changed their
thinking with regard to the rights due same-sex partners. 9 At
best, the events of September 11, 2001 might operate to
humanize gay and lesbian partners in a manner previously
unthinkable. At worst, these benefits are essentially anomalies
reserved for only the most extreme of circumstances. Countless
numbers of gays and lesbians lose their partners under less
cataclysmic circumstances, but the loss remains the same.
Under ordinary circumstances, gays and lesbians have no
guaranteed rights of recovery through tort actions or intestacy
45 Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, NY Assembly and Senate
Unanimously Pass 9/11 Victims Bill (May 7, 2002), available at
http://www.prideagenda.org/pressreleases/pr-5-7-02.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
" S. 7356, A. 11290, 225th Sess. (N.Y. 2002). The relevant text reads:
(7) that domestic partners of victims of the terrorist attacks are eligible for
distributions from the federal victim compensation fund, and the
requirements for awards under the New York State World Trade Center
Relief Fund and other existing state laws, regulations, and executive orders
should guide the federal special master in determining awards and ensuring
that the distribution plan compensates such domestic partners for the losses
they sustained.
Id.
47 S. 7685, A. 11307, 225th Sess. (N.Y. 2002).
4' S. 7792, A. 11812, 225th Sess. (N.Y. 2002).
49 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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law." Therefore, advocates of incrementalism should be wary of
placing too much stock in the effectiveness of the strategy until
legislators demonstrate a consistently progressive approach to
same-sex relationships by establishing real legal protection in
the form of civil unions or equal access to marriage with all its
accompanying rights and privileges.
E. Current Priorities
With the history of the gay rights movement in mind,
what is it that gays and lesbians really want today? More
importantly, what is it that gays and lesbians really need? The
answers to these questions are by no means static. As gays and
lesbians became increasingly open about their sexual
orientation, their relationships similarly take on a more public
persona. And as time goes by, private discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation against individuals arguably
becomes less the issue. Instead, the primary obstacle to gay
and lesbian equality is the discriminatory law and policy
governing same-sex relationships.
If incidents of sexual orientation discrimination are on
the decline as society becomes more willing to accept gays and
lesbians into the mainstream, does SONDA become an
irrelevant victory for gays and lesbians? Following SONDA's
passage, an individual gay or lesbian person might escape
discrimination in the workplace and in housing, while at the
same time that person will experience the harsh consequences
of disparate treatment when the government fails to recognize
long-term, same-sex relationships. Perhaps gay rights are no
longer about protection from private discrimination, but rather
concern affirmative recognition of same-sex relationships.
If the contemporary gay rights movement is becoming
more about relationship recognition than individual equality,
then local advances are inherently limited. Policies regarding
domestic relations have historically been within the purview of
state governments," although in recent years the federal
See Raum v. Restaurant Assocs., Inc., 252 A.D.2d 369, 675 N.Y.S.2d 343
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1998) (holding same-sex partners are not considered spouses for
wrongful death actions); In re Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1993) (holding that same-sex partners are not entitled to rights of
election under current intestacy laws).
5'1 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404-09 (1975) (upholding state residency
requirement in divorce action).
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government has been increasingly vocal on those matters. 2
Localities are powerless to reshape domestic relations law and
are thereby incapable of granting valid marriage certificates
absent authorization by New York State law.u Therefore,
incremental gains among a state's localities in the form of
domestic partnership registries are illusory where specific
rights and privileges turn on marital status. For example, local
domestic partnership registries have no effect on New York
State tax and intestacy laws.' Although several municipalities
are making efforts to create policies that support the increasing
number of long-term same-sex relationships, the state
government has generally refused to accord these relationships
any legal significance." The state's failure to grant recognition
undercuts claims of local victories and ultimately destabilizes
the legal status of same-sex relationships.
IV. THE BATTLEGROUND: ALL POLITICS ARE LOCAL
Because statewide results are mixed and the prospects
for success are limited, the gay rights movement has developed
a strategy of geographic incrementalism in the legislative
arena. In other words, gay advocacy organizations are pushing
for legislation on a county-by-county or municipality-by-
municipality basis. Within each location, advocacy groups push
for advances ranging from anti-gay discrimination ordinances
to same-sex relationship recognition with varying degrees of
emphasis depending on the political climate of the region."7
52 See Libby S. Alder, Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197,
207-215 (1999) (discussing the Defense of Marriage Act, the marriage penalty, and the welfare
laws as examples of federal intervention in domestic relations matters).
The prerequisites and qualifications for a valid marriage are determined
by Article 2 of the Domestic Relations Law. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 5-7 (Consol. 2004).
State law authorizes town and city clerks to issue marriage licenses pursuant to these
regulations. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 14 (Consol. 2004).
Only married individuals are permitted to file joint personal income tax
returns. N.Y. TAX LAW § 601 (Consol. 2004).
Domestic partners are not recognized for the purpose of exercising the
right of election against a decedent's will. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 5-1.1 (Consol.
2004). See also In re Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1993).
"6 With the exception of legislation responding to the events of September 11,
2001, New York State largely fails to legally recognize domestic partnerships and long-
term same-sex relationships. See EMPIRE STATE PRIDE AGENDA FOUNDATION, STATE OF
THE STATE REPORT 2003, VALUING OUR FAMILIES: LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER NEW YORKERS 16-19 (2003), available at
http://www.prideagenda.org/stateofstate/2003/legalstatus.pdf.
57 See generally EMPIRE STATE PRIDE AGENDA FOUNDATION, supra note 56, at
18-19 (describing incremental progress among municipalities).
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Although the current battle largely focuses on
relationship recognition, localities have established special
municipal ordinances that extend equal rights and provide
protection against discrimination to the gay and lesbian
community. Even before SONDA's passage, eleven counties
had ordinances, policies, or proclamations prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination,' and twelve municipalities enacted
similar ordinances.59 These figures might appear encouraging
at first glance. However, New York State comprises sixty-two
counties and dozens of municipalities. Depending on where a
gay or lesbian person resides, he or she may or may not have
been protected prior to SONDA by anti-discrimination law in
housing, credit, employment, and public accommodations. The
results in the eleven counties that independently provided legal
protection for gays and lesbians are encouraging, but they
should not overshadow the fact that most of New York State
remained fertile ground for sexual orientation discrimination
until SONDA provided wider protection for the jurisdictions
that had eluded incremental change.
On the domestic partnership front, New York City and
several other communities are taking steps to extend broad
domestic partnership registries and benefits.' Here again,
localities have stepped in to fill the gaps left by state inaction.
New York State does not have a domestic partnership registry,
civil unions, or same-sex marriage. It did, however, extend
benefits to domestic partners of most of its employees in 1995,
but the move came through contract negotiations with the Civil
Service Employees Association - not through legislation." In
58 The following counties prohibited sexual orientation discrimination:
Albany, Nassau, New York City (New York, Kings, Queens, Bronx, and Richmond
Counties), Onondaga, Suffolk, Tompkins, and Westchester. Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Summary of States, Cities, and Counties Which Prohibit
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/documents/record?record=217 (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
59 The following municipalities prohibited sexual orientation discrimination:
Albany, Alfred, Brighton, Buffalo, East Hampton, Ithaca, Plattsburgh, Rochester,
Southampton, Syracuse, Troy, and Watertown. Id.
60 The following counties or municipalities offer domestic partner registries:Albany (municipality), Ithaca (municipality), New York City (including New York,
Kings, Queens, Bronx, and Richmond Counties), and Rochester (municipality). Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Partial Summary of Domestic Partner Registry
Listings, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=403
(last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
61 Paula Ettelbrick, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Domestic Partner
Benefits for State Employees: Family Policy Project Fact Sheet (Oct. 2000), available at
http://www.ngltf.org/pi/dpbstate.pdf.
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fact, Majority Leader Bruno refused to extend domestic partner
benefits to employees of the New York State Senate until
2001.2 In contrast, Mayor David Dinkins established a New
York City domestic partnership registry by executive order in
1993, which the City Council subsequently codified in 1998.'
Later that same year, Mayor Dinkins settled a lawsuit that
entitled domestic partners of city employees to equal benefits.'
In response to the federal Defense of Marriage Act,' New York
City also enacted an ordinance that extended full faith and
credit to domestic partners and civil unions established in
other counties.' Likewise, the City Council is set to consider
the Equal Benefits Bill, which would forbid the city from
contracting with companies that do not extend benefits to
domestic partners on as equal a basis as married people.67
Taken together, these measures signal a trend where localities
are actively attempting to fill in the gaps left by the state in
relationship recognition.'
The means by which localities are attempting to fill in
the gaps are certainly useful and progressive, but the benefits
they provide are inherently limited because localities are only
empowered to create statutory rights for the specific
jurisdiction. The rights and privileges are not rooted in
constitutional law, which means they cannot stand for
anything other than the particular issue they address.
Consequently, at the end of the day, gays and lesbians remain
virtually unchanged in the eyes of the state and federal courts
62 Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, Statewide Gay Rights Group
Applauds Senate Majority Leader Bruno's Extension of Domestic Partnership Benefits
for Senate Employees (Jan. 19, 2001), available at
http://www.prideagenda.org/pressreleases/pr-1-1
9
-Ol.html.
Mayor Dinkins established the registry by Exec. Order No. 49 (1993). City
Council codified the registry by enacting NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CODE § 3-240 (2001).
Slattery v. City of New York, 266 A.D.2d 24, 697 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1999).
See supra note 20.
New York City, N.Y. Local Law No. 24 of 2002, Council Int. No. 114-A,
available at http://www.council.nyc.ny.us/pdffiles/bills/law02O
2 4.pdf (last visited Apr.
26, 2004).
67 New York City, N.Y. Bill Int. 0271-2002 (introduced Sept. 25, 2002),
available at http://www.council.nyc.ny.us/textfiles/Int%
2 0 0 2 7 1-2 0 0 2 .htm. See also Gay
and Lesbian Independent Democrats, Elected Officials: City Hall Update (Sept. 2002),
at http://www.glid.org/electedupdates.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
Recent reports indicate that at least forty municipalities throughout the
United States have established some form of domestic partner registration. Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Partial Summary of Domestic Partner Registry
Listings (Aug. 1, 2001), at http://www.lambdalegal.orgcgi-bin/iowa/
documents/record?record=403.
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unless they fall within the specific language of a specific
statute affording them specific relief.
V. SEXUAL ORIENTATION JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Long Shadow of the U.S. Supreme Court
One cannot adequately analyze the legal status of gays
and lesbians in New York without considering the impact of
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution.
Specifically, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has influenced
the New York State Court of Appeals' interpretation of the
state's rights to privacy and equal protection. When the Court
of Appeals struck down New York's law prohibiting sodomy,'
the Court of Appeals relied heavily, if not exclusively, on the
substantive due process right to privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the federal Constitution.o Similarly, the Court
of Appeals relied on the right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment when it struck down a New York City
executive order that prohibited awarding city contracts to
organizations that discriminated on the basis of sexual
orientation." In so doing, the Court of Appeals also expressly
declined consideration of whether discrimination based on
sexual orientation required a higher level of scrutiny and
instead deferred to federal cases."2 Accordingly, given the
congruence between the jurisprudence of New York and the
United States, it is essential to consider the implications of the
Supreme Court's cornerstone cases adjudicating the privacy
and equal protection rights of gays and lesbians.
Prior to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Lawrence v. Texas,73 homosexuality had the dismal distinction
69 People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980).
70 Under substantive due process, the privacy rights that have previously
been recognized by the Court are those which are "fundamental or implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). The right of
privacy has been recognized with regard to child rearing and education, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); contraception for married people, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); choice of a spouse, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1(1967); contraception for unmarried people, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and family relations, Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
71 Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children v. City of New
York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 360 n.6, 482 N.E.2d 1, 8 n.6 (1985).
72 65 N.Y.2d at 364, 482 N.E.2d at 10.
73 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) [hereinafter Lawrence].
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of being among those "behaviors" that the United States
Supreme Court rebuked as unworthy of constitutional
protection within the "penumbra" of the right to privacy.74
Homosexuality shared company with the likes of incest and
bigamy.75 In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court crystallized federal
sexual orientation jurisprudence when it found in Bowers v.
Hardwick7 that Georgia's sodomy statute enforced only against
homosexuals violated no constitutional rights.7 The Court
explicitly held that the fundamental right of privacy outlined in
a series of previous cases did not reach the issue of homosexual
sodomy." In so holding, the Court not only validated the
Georgia statute, but also established a legal basis for
discrimination against gays and lesbians outside of the same-
sex sodomy context by attaching a criminal stigma to behavior
intertwined with the homosexual identity. Sodomy laws went
on to be frequently invoked in civil cases related to child
custody, employment, and education.79 In one fell swoop, the
Court essentially constructed a barrier to gay and lesbian
equality that would be challenged incrementally in the
legislative arena for years to come, with mixed results.
Homosexuality emerged from the dark shadows of
history to overcome judicial condemnation when the Court
decided Lawrence v. Texas in June 2003. John Lawrence and
Tyron Garner were arrested in Lawrence's Houston home and
jailed overnight after police officers, responding to a false
report from an acquaintance, found the men engaged in
private, consensual sex.' Once convicted, they were forced to
pay fines and were subsequently considered sex offenders in
several states.8' After a series of appeals in the state courts,
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund filed a petition for
74 See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)
(describing various state regulations that place bans on certain relations).
76 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
77 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189-90.
78 Id. at 190.
79 Joseph Landau, Sodomy Statutes as Weapons: Ripple Effect, NEW
REPUBLIC, June 23, 2003, at 12.
80 Press Release, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, U.S. Supreme
Court Will Hear Lambda Legal's Challenge To Texas 'Homosexual Conduct' Law (Dec.
2, 2002), at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=l1
7 6
.
81 Id.
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certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which it granted in
December 2002.82
The Supreme Court's decision to hear the case
forecasted a major turning point in sexual orientation
jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court had the opportunity to
remedy the problems created by its decision in Bowers, which
crippled the movement to secure equal rights for gays and
lesbians through the courts.' Lambda argued that Bowers was
wrongly decided because Texas's prohibition of sodomy between
same-sex partners ' violated both the rights to privacy and
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
federal Constitution. Given the Court's long history of strictly
defining the right to privacy within the scope of those things
that are "deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition,"'
it seemed unlikely that the Court would reverse Bowers on
privacy grounds. In order to do so, the Court would seemingly
be required to reposition the right of privacy in its entirety and
disturb portions of the relatively well-settled body of law in
that arena."
Despite stare decisis principles that might have weighed
against overruling Bowers, the Supreme Court removed
homosexuality from the constitutional closet by overruling its
previous decision and declaring that prohibitions against
private same-sex sodomy violated the right to privacy under
the Due Process Clause.87 In the process of doing so, the Court
revisited and reevaluated the historical basis for legal and
moral condemnation of same-sex sodomy and determined that
Bowers relied too heavily on ambiguous historical judgments
concerning homosexuality.' The Court also reasoned that the
issue before it was less about same-sex sodomy and more about
82 Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tx. Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted,
123 S.Ct. 661 (Dec. 2, 2002) (No. 02-102).
83 See Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531
(1992).
84 The statute criminalizing "homosexual conduct" states that a "person
commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual
of the same sex" and an "offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor." TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a)-(b) (Vernon 2003). "Deviate sexual intercourse" is defined
in Texas as "any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth
or anus of another person; or the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another
person with an object." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01 (Vernon 2003).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
8 See supra note 70.
87 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
88 Id. at 2478-80.
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the liberty afforded by the Constitution that enables adults to
make individual choices concerning their intimate
relationships without government interference. 9 Finally, the
Court pointed to legal developments both within and outside of
the United States that indicated an outright rejection or at
least serious erosion of the reasoning employed in Bowers.'
Although Bowers was ripe for judicial evisceration,
there were other options at the Court's disposal that would
have provided an equally reasonable basis to declare the Texas
statute unconstitutional. Moreover, the other vehicles might
have provided gays and lesbians with a powerful tool to effect
future change. In particular, the Court could have turned to
Romer v. Evans" and reevaluated the appropriate standard of
review for classifications based on sexual orientation in the
context of equal protection challenges.
In Romer, the Court found that a Colorado
constitutional amendment that barred anti-discrimination
measures intended to protect gays and lesbians violated the
Equal Protection Clause by subjecting one group to a
disadvantage that no other group suffered.92 After various
Colorado municipalities passed ordinances banning
discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing,
employment, education, public accommodations, health and
welfare services, and other transactions and activities,
Colorado voters adopted by statewide referendum "Amendment
2" to the state constitution. The amendment precluded all
legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or
local government designed to protect the status of persons
based on their homosexual or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices, or relationships. 3 The primary rationale the state
offered for "Amendment 2" was "respect for other citizens'
freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of
landlords or employers who have personal or religious
objections to homosexuality."94 The State also asserted its
"interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination against
other groups."" Ultimately, the Court decided Romer on two
89 Id. at 2478.
9o Id. at 2483.
9' Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
92 Id.
93 id.
' Id. at 635.
95 Id.
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grounds. First, the Court held that the amendment failed even
the most deferential rational basis test.' Second, the Court
found that absent a rational basis, the amendment could have
no other purpose than to effectuate animosity by inflicting an
injury on a specific class of people."
Although Romer is encouraging at first glance, it is
important to recognize that the Court did not take an
affirmative stance towards the rights of gays and lesbians in
the equal protection context. While the Court could have
identified gays and lesbians as a quasi-suspect class entitled to
heightened scrutiny in equal protection challenges to
classifications based on sexual orientation, the Court steered
clear of the issue by limiting its holding to the context of a state
referendum and the attendant political process. The Court
specifically held that states could not intentionally target gays
and lesbians with laws designed to limit their ability to attain
protection from discrimination through ordinary legislative
processes.9 Moreover, the Court was silent with regard to what
special privileges states could grant certain groups and
withhold from other groups, such as marriage or equal
recognition of same-sex relationships. In other words, Romer
limits what states can take away from gays and lesbians as a
political group, but it does not indicate what states must
provide gays and lesbians under the Equal Protection Clause,
nor does it indicate whether a court should categorize
homosexuals as a quasi-suspect class.'
By invoking and amplifying Romer to resolve Lawrence,
the Court would likely have been required to extend Romer
beyond the meaning it has held to date. However, the
argument is viable based on the Court's previous delineations
of quasi-suspect classes." ° More importantly, a ruling based on
Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
97 Id. at 632-35.
98 Id. at 635-36.
9 Id. at 632.
'00 The Court has articulated four criteria that seem to indicate whether
heightened scrutiny is appropriate for a given classification:(a) an immutable trait that is a product of factors beyond a class member's
control; (b) unique disabilities based on 'incorrect stereotypes" of abilities and
merit; (c) a history of discrimination against the class; and (d) the class is a
politically powerless minority.
Harris M. Miller II, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened
Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 812 (1984).
None of the factors standing alone indicates whether a particular
classification should receive heightened scrutiny. Yet, these criteria, taken
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heightened scrutiny would have placed gay rights squarely in
the positive law and public arenas, as opposed to the bedrooms
of consenting adults within the penumbra of privacy. If the
Court had applied heightened scrutiny while engaging in an
equal protection analysis of the statute at issue in Lawrence,
the Court would have arguably opened the door for future
challenges to laws regarding issues ranging from marriage to
adoption to homosexuals in the military. However, the Court's
actual ruling on privacy grounds fails to create similar
opportunities. Indeed, the Court specifically pointed out that
its reading of the issues presented by Lawrence did not "involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.... Whereas
the ruling based on privacy considerations operated to inform
state governments as to where not to go, a ruling based on
equal protection grounds would have operated to inform state
governments of where they ought to go.
By considering the Court's approach to overruling
Bowers, while also bearing in mind the subsequent limited
interpretations of Romer to its particular facts, '2 observers
would be well advised to remember that even the most
promising cases can be rendered impotent by limiting readings
of their ultimate holdings. Nevertheless, Bowers reminds us to
remain cognizant of the impact that one landmark case can
have on an entire legal landscape. Bowers served to undermine
the legal interests of gays and lesbians, while at the same time
prompting local legislative incremental action to remedy the
harm done. One might reasonably argue that these
incremental developments created an atmosphere in which the
Supreme Court could overrule itself in a relatively short period
of time. However, these incremental developments gain little
traction without a broad legal doctrine to support the reasoning
behind them. By unraveling the flawed reasoning of Bowers,
Lawrence reverses the anti-gay momentum both created and
sustained by Bowers and sets the stage for advances beyond
together and applied in light of the normative theories from which they are
derived, yield a test that helps determine which classifications need special
judicial protection.
Id.
10 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
102 See Robert D. Dodson, Homosexual Discrimination and Gender: Was
Romer v. Evans Really A Victory for Gay Rights?, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 271 (1999).
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the scope of a fragmented incremental approach to equal rights
for gays and lesbians.
B. New York State Sexual Orientation Jurisprudence
Without consistent substantive progress in the state
legislature and federal courts, it would be logical for the gay
community to take its case to the state courts. But like most
courts throughout the United States, the New York State Court
of Appeals has struggled to answer the unique legal questions
presented by homosexuality and has mimicked Supreme Court
sexual orientation jurisprudence.' 3 Although often considered a
political minority group, the gay and lesbian community has
failed to achieve legal status as a suspect class that would
prompt heightened scrutiny of discriminatory legislation in
New York and elsewhere.'" Courts often refuse to recognize
gays, lesbians and bisexuals as a discrete minority group on
the basis that the community is defined by conduct, not an
immutable trait.'5 Without heightened scrutiny, courts easily
uphold discriminatory practices against the gay and lesbian
community through rational basis review. 6 Although the New
York State Appellate Division was, on one occasion, willing to
consider heightened scrutiny for state action against gays and
lesbians on the basis of sexual orientation,' 7 the Court of
Appeals backed away from such consideration when it modified
and affirmed the decision.'0 Since then, there has not been a
successful challenge in the New York State Court of Appeals to
broad discriminatory practices against gays and lesbians.
Instead, recent litigation on behalf of the gay community has
mirrored local legislative activity in that it has focused on
specific facets of relationship recognition, rather than broad
equality principles. The trend is either a reaction to the current
state of sexual orientation jurisprudence or the product of
'm See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
'04 See, e.g., Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children v. City
of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 364 482 N.E.2d 1, 10 (1985). See generally Miller, supra
note 100.
,05 See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that
homosexuality, defined by conduct, is subject to rational basis test).
106 See, e.g., id.; Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
107 Under 21 v. City of New York, 108 A.D.2d 250, 488 N.Y.S.2d 669 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1985).
'oo Under 21, 65 N.Y.2d 344. 482 N.E.2d 344 (1985).
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deliberate incremental strategy to secure small but consistent
victories.
C. Issues Raised by Cornerstone Cases in New York State
New York State's sexual orientation jurisprudence has
appeared progressive and promising at times, but a complete or
consistent set of legal precedents favoring equality for gays and
lesbians as individuals and as partners now appears foreclosed
without legislative encouragement. In a series of cases, the
courts have both extended and denied legal protection to the
gay and lesbian community. In one exceptional case, the Court
of Appeals defined "family" in the real estate law context to
allow a same-sex partner to remain in a rent-stabilized
apartment after the death of one partner." Yet in another case,
a same-sex partner was not allowed to recover for the wrongful
death of his partner." In a similar case, a same-sex partner
was not allowed the right of election against the will of his
deceased partner.'" On the other hand, in the Domestic
Relations Law context, the court interpreted adoption law to
allow for same-sex second-parent adoption."' In yet another
case, this one involving visitation rights, the court denied
standing to a lesbian woman who functioned as the co-parent of
her former partner's biological child."3 At once recognizing gay
and lesbian interests while simultaneously denying them
access to legal protections and privileges, the following cases
demonstrate the schizophrenic approach the courts take
towards gay rights in New York State.
1. Sexual Practices: People v. Onofre
In 1980, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
coupling when it found New York's sodomy law
unconstitutional in People v. Onofre." In the consolidated case,
five defendants were charged and convicted under New York
penal laws prohibiting certain sexual acts between non-
'09 Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49 (1989).
"" Raum v. Restaurant Assocs., Inc., 252 A.D.2d 369, 675 N.Y.S.2d 343 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1998).
. In re Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1993).
112 In re Dana, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 660 N.E.2d 397 (1995).
"3 Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27 (1991).
14 51 N.Y.2d 476. 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980).
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married persons."' The defendants included both heterosexuals
and homosexuals."' The defendants claimed the law was
unconstitutional based on both equal protection and privacy
principles."7
Striking down the law, the court held that there was no
rational relationship between the proscribed acts and the
classification, as the statute only applied to non-married
individuals."' The state failed to make any showing as to how
the statute banning consensual sodomy between persons not
married to each other preserved or fostered marriage."9
However, the thrust of the court's decision was that the statute
violated the defendants' right of privacy under the federal
Constitution, as expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court's series
of holdings outlining the right.'0 The Court found that the state
failed to demonstrate how government interference with the
practice of personal choice in matters of intimate sexual
behavior out of view of the public and with no commercial
component would serve to advance the cause of public morality
or do anything other than restrict individual conduct and
impose a concept of private morality chosen by the state.' In
essence, the court found that there was not even a rational
relationship between the sodomy statute and government
interests.
Although celebrated by the gay and lesbian community,
Onofre simply fails to translate into meaningful precedent for
establishing an equal protection doctrine or privacy rights that
advance the interests of gays and lesbians. By finding that the
statute violated federal equal protection principles, the court
did not rest its decision on the basis of its particular impact on
gays and lesbians. The classification and the encroachment on
the right to privacy were both unconstitutional because the
State failed to establish a link between its interests in
preserving public morality and preventing unmarried
individuals from engaging in sodomy.'22 Importantly, the
decision did not turn on the gender and sexual orientation of
15 51 N.Y.2d at 484, 415 N.E.2d at 938.
116 Id.
117 Id.
18 51 N.Y.2d at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 938.
119 Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 941.
120 51 N.Y.2d at 485-86, 415 N.E.2d at 939-940.
1 51 N.Y.2d at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 943.
122 51 N.Y.2d at 490-492, 415 N.E.2d at 941-943.
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the parties engaging in the activity. There is no question that
gays and lesbians benefited from the decision, but the benefit
was incidental and not a statement about New York State's
privacy or equal protection jurisprudence as it relates to the
gay and lesbian community itself.
2. Alternative Routes to Relationship Recognition: In
re Adoption of Robert Paul P. "
In this rather unusual and clever case, the appellants
were two men who lived together for over twenty-five years.
The older of the two men, who was fifty-seven years old,
submitted a petition to adopt the younger man, who was fifty
years old.'22 The two shared a same-sex, long-term relationship
and sought an adoption for social, financial, and emotional
reasons.'26 After a hearing where both partners testified, and
following receipt of a probation investigation that supported
the position asserted by the two men, the family court denied
their petition."7 The family court concluded that the parties
were attempting to utilize the adoption process as a substitute
for marriage, wills, and business contracts, and that the two
men "lacked any semblance of a parent-child relationship" for
which the adoption statute was designed to accommodate. 8
Affirming the decision, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
indicated some willingness to entertain the possibility that a
same-sex legal relationship would be legally viable in a
different context.' The difficulty regarded the appellant's
efforts to manipulate the adoption law in a manner
inconsistent with legislative intent.'0 The court held that:
If the adoption laws are to be changed so as to permit sexual lovers,
homosexual or heterosexual, to adopt one another for the purpose of
giving a non-matrimonial legal status to their relationship, or if a
separate institution is to be established for the same purpose, it is
for the Legislature, as a matter of State public policy, to do so.
Absent any such recognition of that relationship coming from the
"' 63 N.Y.2d 233,471 N.E.2d 424 (1984).
124 63 N.Y.2d at 235, 471 N.E.2d at 425.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
'2 Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d at 239, 471 N.E.2d at 427 (1984).
130 Id.
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Legislature, however, the courts ought not to create the same under
the rubric of adoption. 3'
Here, we see the emergence of what ultimately became
a trend in New York's same-sex relationship jurisprudence.
Where issues of sexuality and same-sex relationships come into
play, the court refers back to the legislature. Clearly, this case
tested the bounds of what a court theoretically could do in light
of clear statutory language and legislative intent. Had this case
stood alone with regard to deference to the state legislature,
one might easily dismiss it from the same-sex relationship
debate. However, subsequent cases demonstrated the court's
reluctance to interpret state law in a manner consistent with
the needs of gays and lesbians in domestic relations law until
the state legislature itself so signals.3 '
To be fair, the Court of Appeals would have run afoul of
judicial restraint had it gone any further in its opinion than to
highlight the absence of same-sex relationship recognition.
Adoption is not the appropriate mechanism to recognize long-
standing committed adult relationships. However, this case
illustrates the lengths to which gays and lesbians will go in
pushing for some degree of state recognition of their
relationships within the context of already existing law. Other
than the spousal relationship, the guardian-adoptee
relationship is the only other state-recognized relationship
characterized by family intimacy. If not marriage and if not
adoption, then what remains for same-sex couples who seek
nothing more than traditional recognition of their relationship,
a relationship that comports with all the traditional dynamics
of spouses other than their respective genders? The Court of
Appeals told gays and lesbians to look to the legislature for the
answer. Yet this is the same legislature that failed to pass anti-
gay discrimination legislation for decades. And when SONDA
was ultimately passed in 2002, it was the legislature that
foreclosed any possibility that same-sex couples will be allowed
to marry on the strength of that bill."
131 id.
132 See In re Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1993) (intestacy rights); Raum v. Restaurant Assocs., Inc., 252 A.D.2d 369, 675
N.Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1998) (standing in tort actions); Alison D. v. Virginia
M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27 (1991) (parentalrights).
133 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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3. The Definition of Family: Braschi v. Stahl
Associates, Inc."4
Several years after gays and lesbians were precluded
from adopting one another as a substitute for marriage, the
Court of Appeals determined that there were circumstances
that allowed for some degree of legal recognition of long-term
same-sex relationships. Following the death of his partner,
Miguel Braschi sought judicial relief granting him the right to
remain in the apartment they had shared for eleven years. '
Because his name was not on the lease, Stahl Associates, the
building owner, threatened to evict Braschi, whom he claimed
was merely a licensee.3 Braschi initiated an action for a
permanent injunction and a declaration of entitlement to
occupy the apartment under New York City Rent and Eviction
Regulations,' 7 which blocked the eviction of family members
who had lived with the deceased tenant."8 The Supreme Court
found in favor of Braschi, but the Appellate Division reversed,
finding that protection from eviction applied only to "family
members within traditionally legally recognized familial
relationships.." 9
Reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals
reasoned that the legislative intent when defining "family" in
the real estate and succession context was to describe a
functional family.'40 It held that the intended protection against
sudden eviction "should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions
or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the
reality of family life."' The court further held that "in the
context of eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid,
view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners whose
relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional
and financial commitment and interdependence."4 The court
13 74 N.Y.2d 201,543 N.E.2d 49 (1989).
135 74 N.Y.2d at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 50-51.
136 74 N.Y.2d at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 51.
137 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CODES, RULES & REGULATIONS, tit. 9, pt. 2204.6
(1984). At the time of litigation, the regulation provided that upon the death of a rent-
controlled tenant, the landlord may not dispossess "either the surviving spouse of the
deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's family who has been
living with the tenant." Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 51.
13 Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 51.
139 74 N.Y.2d at 207, 543 N.E.2d at 51.
140 74 N.Y.2d at 211-12, 543 N.E.2d at 53-54.
" 74 N.Y.2d at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53.
142 74 N.Y.2d at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53-54.
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concluded that "this view comports both with our society's
traditional concept of 'family' and with the expectations of
individuals who live in such nuclear units.".3
Given the court's liberal interpretation of "family," this
case continues to be noteworthy as gays and lesbians focus on
relationship recognition. Although encouraging on its face, the
case did not have the broad impact anticipated. Instead, the
court's holding has subsequently been limited to the real estate
context.' It is difficult to reconcile how the family and spousal
relationships at issue in this case were categorized "traditional"
while the same relationships fail to gain equal footing in other
settings, including actions for wrongful death, inheritance
rights, and child visitation. Aside from the inexplicable denial
of these statutory rights from gays and lesbians, it is even more
difficult to reconcile the court's use of "tradition" in this context
with the court's adherence to previous Supreme Court due
process jurisprudence finding that homosexuality was anything
but "traditional" in the privacy context.'45 One cannot escape
the conclusion that there is substantial divergence between
incremental statutory enactment and the essence of current
sexual orientation jurisprudence. When limited to specific
statutory regulations and entitlements, same-sex relationships
are "traditional." However, same-sex relationships are
anything but "traditional" in the broader context of sexual
orientation jurisprudence, which is where such a finding would
have the greatest impact on the rights of gays and lesbians.
4. Spousal Intestacy Rights: In re Estate of Cooper
The limits of Braschi were soon tested in In re Estate of
Cooper.' In that case, the question was whether the survivor of
a same-sex relationship, alleged to be a "spousal relationship,"
was entitled to a right of election against the decedent's will,
pursuant to New York's right of election statute. "7 William
143 Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d 201, 211, 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (1989).
144 See In re Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1993) (intestacy rights); Raum v. Restaurant Assocs., Inc., 252 A.D.2d 369, 675
N.Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1998) (standing in tort actions).
145 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
146 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1993).
14' N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 5-1.1 (Consol. 1993). The relevant text states
that "the elective share of the surviving spouse is one-third of the net estate if the
decedent is survived by one or more issue and, in all other cases, one-half of such net
estate." Id.
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Thomas Cooper died on February 19, 1988."' He died testate,
leaving everything to his partner of four years as a specific and
residuary legatee, with the exception of certain real estate,
allegedly constituting over eighty percent of the value of the
estate, which was left to a partner with whom Cooper had
previously been in a relationship. "9 Prior to his death, Cooper
and the surviving partner kept a common home, shared
expenses, considered themselves spouses, and had a physical
relationship.'" In accordance with the definition of "family" set
forth in Braschi,' the surviving partner argued that he should
be considered a "surviving spouse" in the right of election
context. 2 Additionally, the surviving spouse argued that a
narrow definition of "surviving spouse" is unconstitutional as it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the state
Constitution.'53  Specifically, he argued that this
unconstitutional definition directly derives from and
compounds the state's unconstitutional conduct in interpreting
the Domestic Relations Law as prohibiting same-sex partners
from obtaining marriage licenses."
Going to great lengths to explain why the definition of
"family" set forth in Braschi did not apply to this case, the
Appellate Division concluded that the surviving partner was
not a spouse for right of election purposes.'5 In particular, the
opinion emphasized the legislature's intent in defining
"surviving spouse" as a husband or wife in a separate section of
the relevant law. 5' Moreover, the Appellate Division pointed to
Alison D. v. Virginia M., "7 where the Court of Appeals declined
to extend the Braschi definition of "family" to a lesbian who
sought visitation rights to the biological child of her former
same-sex partner." With regard to the equal protection
argument, the Appellate Division relied heavily on existing
148 Cooper, 187 A.D.2d at 129-30, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 797-99.
149 Id.
15' Id.
'' See Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53-54; see also supra note
141-43 and accompany text.
1" See Cooper, 187 A.D.2d at 129-30, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 797-98; see also supra
note 147.
1,3 187 A.D.2d at 132, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
154 id.
,55 187 A.D.2d at 131-32, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
15 187 A.D.2d at 131, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
157 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27 (1991).
'5 Cooper, 187 A.D.2d at 132, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
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interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal
Constitution and determined that rational basis review was the
appropriate standard to apply to classifications based on sexual
orientation. 9 Under rational basis review, the state's interest
in marriage's procreative function was reasonable." The court
also went beyond the equal protection argument, holding that
contemporary concepts of marriage and societal interests would
not justify the "use of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment [as] a charter for restructuring [marriage] by
judicial legislation.''
The surviving partner and Cooper's estate eventually
settled the case, which prevented review by the Court of
Appeals. However, it is safe to say that the decision was by no
means aberrant. A similar result occurred in Raum v.
Restaurant Associates, Inc.,"' which also never made its way to
the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has not
subsequently applied an expanded view of "family"" even
where the reasoning behind Braschi would seem to apply in the
particular context." Therefore, the Appellate Division's
reliance on Alison D. v. Virginia M. in Cooper is not unfounded.
Until the Court of Appeals issues a new decision extending a
flexible definition of "family" to a broader gay rights context,
lower courts are likely to limit Braschi to cases with very
similar facts in much the same way that Romer has been
applied conservatively in the lower federal courts."'
5. Standing in Tort Actions: Raum v. Restaurant
Associates, Inc."'
In the Raum case, the surviving partner of a same-sex
relationship attempted to sue for the wrongful death of his
partner. The case raised similar issues to those raised in In re
19 187 A.D.2d at 134, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
1" 187 A.D.2d at 133, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799-800.
161 187 A.D.2d at 134, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (quoting Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1971)).
162 252 A.D.2d 369, 675 N.Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1998) (holding that
same-sex partners are not considered spouses for wrongful death actions).
"' See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
"3 See supra notes 110, 111, 113 and accompanying text.
"3 See Dodson, supra note 102. But see Langan ex rel. Estate of Spicehandler
v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of N.Y., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 196 Misc. 2d 440 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 2003) (holding that a surviving partner of a Vermont civil union is entitled to
sue for wrongful death under full faith and credit principles).
" 252 A.D.2d 369, 675 N.Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1998).
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Estate of Cooper, this time examining four provisions of the
wrongful death statute and the definition of spouse contained
within them."7 The surviving partner argued that his marital
status should not be a barrier to recovering tort damages
because he is barred from marrying the partner of his
choosing. ' He also suggested that an entity could have a
different legal status in different contexts for public policy
reasons." Essentially, the surviving partner was urging
application of the Braschi definition of "family" to tort actions.
Here again, the Appellate Division declined to apply a
more flexible definition of "spouse" or "family" to accommodate
same-sex relationships. It held that the statute "does not give
individuals not married to the decedent (other than certain
blood relatives) a right to bring a wrongful-death action,
operates without regard to sexual orientation in that
unmarried couples living together, whether heterosexual or
homosexual, similarly lack the right to bring a wrongful-death
action, and, as such, the statute does not discriminate against
same-sex partners in spousal-type relationships.' 7 ° It also
found that there was no merit to the plaintiffs argument that
the word "spouse" should be read to include such same-sex
partners.'7 ' Moreover, the Appellate Division relied on Cooper to
support its conclusion that "[slince it is not within the judicial
province to redefine terms given clear meaning in a statute,
plaintiffs sole recourse lies in legislative action."'72 But as the
gay and lesbian community knows, the New York State
legislature is not poised to act on behalf of same-sex
partnerships in any meaningful way. There was no indication
that the legislature would do so at the time of the decision, nor
is there any indication that it is now willing to do so' 7 absent
exceptional circumstances."'
167 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 5-4.1, 1-2.5, 4-1.1, 5-1.2 (Consol. 1998).
'6 Raum, 252 A.D.2d at 372, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
169 id.
170 252 A.D.2d at 370, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
174 See supra Part III.D.
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6. Parenting: Alison D. v. Virginia M.
The Court of Appeals continues to adhere to a
conventional view of family even where it appears that the best
interests of a child would be advanced by a more flexible
definition. In Alison D. v. Virginia M., ' Alison sought
visitation with a child she had raised with her former same-sex
partner pursuant to state domestic relations law.7 ' Three years
after commencing their relationship, Alison and Virginia
decided to have a child and agreed that Virginia would be
artificially inseminated."' Together, they planned for the
conception and birth of the child and agreed to share jointly all
rights and responsibilities of child rearing.'78 Virginia gave
birth to a baby boy, who was given Alison's last name as his
middle name and Virginia's last name as his last name. 7'
Alison shared in all birthing expenses and continued to provide
for his support." The couple also jointly cared for and made
decisions regarding the child. 8' Two years later, Alison and
Virginia terminated their relationship and agreed to a
visitation schedule whereby Alison continued to see the child a
few times a week.8" Alison also agreed to continue to pay one
half of the mortgage and major household expenses." By this
time, the child had referred to both Alison and Virginia as
"mommy."1  Alison's visitation with the child continued for
three years, at which time Virginia bought out Alison's interest
175 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27 (1991).
176 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70(a) (Consol. 1990). The relevant text states:
Where a minor child is residing within this state, either parent may apply to
the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such minor child
brought before such court; and on the return thereof, the court, on due
consideration, may award the natural guardianship, charge and custody of
such child to either parent for such time, under such regulations and
restrictions, and with such provisions and directions, as the case may require,
and may at any time thereafter vacate or modify such order. In all cases
there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent,
but the court shall determine solely what is for the best interest of the child,
and what will best promote its welfare and happiness, and make award
accordingly.
Id.
177 77 N.Y.2d at 655, 572 N.E.2d at 28.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
18 Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 655, 572 N.E.2d at 28.
183 Id.
184 Id.
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in the house and then began to restrict visitation with the
child.'5 One year later, Alison moved to Ireland to pursue
career opportunities, but continued her attempts to
communicate with the child.' Thereafter, Virginia terminated
all contact between Alison and the child and returned all of her
gifts and letters.'87 There was no dispute that respondent was a
fit parent.'
While acknowledging that the child in this particular
case would probably benefit from visitation with Alison, the
Court of Appeals held that Alison lacked standing to assert
visitation rights.'89 Specifically, the court rejected Alison's
argument that the definition of "parent" should be expanded to
include "de facto" parents, a definition that would have
provided standing for Alison to assert visitation rights." The
court reasoned that tradition dictated that only the mother or
father has the right to the care and custody of a child, even in
situations where the non-parent has exercised some control
over the child with the parent's consent.' Furthermore, the
court pointed out that the legislature granted a specific
exception to the rule for grandparent'" and sibling'93 visitation
rights, but did not create a similar exception for a "third
person" or "de facto" parent like Alison.' In other words,
absent an express exception created by the legislature, the
court simply would not grant Alison standing to seek visitation
even if it were to serve the child's best interests, and even
though she had played an integral role as one of the child's
"mommies."
Although it is reasonable to exercise caution when
allowing non-parents to seek visitation, the outright denial of
Alison's request produced an absurd result that is uniquely
detrimental to the gay and lesbian community. Same-sex
partners often turn to alternative methods of childbearing to
185 Id.
186 Id.
Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 655, 572 N.E.2d at 28.
188 77 N.Y.2d at 655, 572 N.E.2d at 29.
189 77 N.Y.2d at 657, 572 N.E.2d at 29.
190 Id.
191 Id.
," N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (Consol. 1989).
193 Id. § 71.
19 Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 656-57, 572 N.E.2d at 29-30.
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become parents.' 9 Although these couples plan to raise the
child together, these methods usually require the biological
involvement of only one partner. Regardless of the parent-child
relationship that develops over time, courts regularly view the
non-biological parent as a stranger to the child.' In the case of
Alison and many others, nothing could be further from reality.
If the Court of Appeals is willing emphasize reality over
statutory language in the real estate context for the sake of
apartment succession,'97 then it should follow that rigid
statutory interpretation should give way to the best interests of
a child in the visitation context. Here again, the absence of a
consistent approach to the rights of gays and lesbians produces
irreconcilable results.
7. Adoption: In re Jacob and Dana
The decision in Alison D. is particularly striking in light
of the earlier case of In re Jacob and Dana,'9  where the Court
of Appeals determined that New York's adoption laws" are
gender neutral and permit second-parent adoption without the
termination of another's parental rights. In this consolidated
case, one unmarried heterosexual couple and one homosexual
couple sought second-parent adoptions without termination of
the biological parent's rights, which was contrary to how
adoption ordinarily operated with regard to the rights of a
biological parent in the absence of marriage."0 Although court-
ordered reports indicated that the adoptions would benefit the
children, the lower courts determined that Jacob could not be
adopted absent marriage between the heterosexual couple and
that Dana could not be adopted without terminating her
natural, homosexual mother's parental rights."'
In reversing the lower court's decision, the Court of
Appeals went to great lengths to explain why its interpretation
'95 Jane E. Brody, Gay Families Flourish as Acceptance Grows, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2003, at F7.
'96 See, e.g., Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Cal. App. Ct. 1990); Liston
v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL 467327 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1997); In re
Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt.
1997).
197 See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
198 86 N.Y.2d 651, 660 N.E.2d 397 (1995).
'99 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 110, 117 (1991).
29 86 N.Y.2d at 656-57, 660 N.E.2d at 398-99.
201 86 N.Y.2d at 656-57, 660 N.E.2d at 398.
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of the relevant statutes comported with both their text and the
underlying purpose of adoption."'2 Although the court has
consistently declined to apply the Braschi functional definition
of family 3 in other contexts, it did so here without hesitation."
In fact, the court even suggested that its proper function was to
infuse the statute with practical meaning even if it were
outside of the legislature's original intent."5 The court stated
that "the Legislature that last codified [the statute] in 1938
may never have envisioned families that 'include[] two adult
lifetime partners whose relationship is ... characterized by an
emotional and financial commitment and interdependence,'
[but] it is clear that [the statute], designed as a shield to
protect new adoptive families, was never intended as a sword
to prohibit otherwise beneficial intrafamily adoptions by second
parents. " '
The question prompted by the court's reasoning is
whether any statute is intended to prohibit legal
accommodation of otherwise beneficial relationships. Indeed,
previous decisions suggest that the answer is in the
affirmative."7 One is hard-pressed to identify the reasoning
behind accommodating same-sex relationships in real estate
and adoption, but not in tort or intestacy rights. A possible
explanation for the court's willingness to do so in the adoption
context is the benefit the state stands to gain from granting
adoptions by same-sex partners. The state is interested in
providing stable and secure homes for children. However, if the
qualities of a same-sex relationship warrant state recognition
and accommodation for adoption purposes, should not those
same qualities lead the court to extend its recognition of the
relationship even absent a child? Moreover, if the court is
capable of manipulating the legislature's intent here, then the
court's claim that it cannot do so in other contexts rings hollow.
When this case is considered with others, the need for a clear
and consistent approach to the rights of gays and lesbians in
202 86 N.Y.2d at 657-59, 660 N.E.2d at 398-400.
203 See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
204 86 N.Y.2d. at 668, 660 N.E.2d at 405.
20r 86 N.Y.2d at 668-69, 660 N.E.2d at 405-06.
2 86 N.Y.2d at 668-69, 660 N.E.2d at 405 (quoting Braschi. v Stahl Assocs.,
Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 211, 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (1989)).
201 See In re Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1993) (intestacy rights); Raum v. Restaurant Assocs., Inc., 252 A.D.2d 369, 675
N.Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1998) (standing in tort actions); Alison D. v. Virginia
M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27 (1991) (parental rights).
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New York becomes readily apparent. The piecemeal approach
taken by the courts ultimately operates to undermine the
progress made by gays and lesbians in other arenas and
thereby exacerbates the instability of gay rights in New York.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCREMENTALISM
It is indeed difficult to reconcile the incremental
progress gays and lesbians have achieved in the legislative
arena with the largely dismal sexual orientation jurisprudence
in New York State. Although now armed with statewide
protection from anti-gay discrimination, gays and lesbians
continue to confront an inconsistent patchwork of legal rights
and recognition that operates to compromise their social and
political position. The patchwork is primarily constructed of
bits and pieces of local ordinances along with a few fragments
of state law randomly sewn in throughout the overall
composition. Like most patchwork compositions, the gay rights
landscape in New York is only as strong as the ties that bind it.
Without well-developed federal law supporting the rights of
gays and lesbians, the New York Court of Appeals' failure to
set forth progressive sexual orientation jurisprudence
undermines the political and legal interests of gays and
lesbians.
If incremental progress creates a false sense of progress
or security within the gay community, inconsistent or
inadequate laws are arguably worse than no laws whatsoever.
If one segment of the community experiences or even perceives
advances, the overall community begins to lose its common
legal trait of disparate treatment. Without the common trait, or
where one segment of the community determines it can best
advance its interests independently, the community stands to
be divided and effectively conquered. For example, the "divide
and conquer" phenomenon emerged as SONDA was poised for
passage."'8 Although typically allied with the gay and lesbian
community in New York, the transsexual community was
outraged when "gender identity and expression" was not
included in the language of SONDA.2 ' Although some leaders of
the gay community and several lawmakers asserted that
transsexuals were already covered by the existing law's
208 See supra section Part III.B-C.
201 See Dewan, supra note 34.
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prohibition discrimination based on gender, ° leaders of the
transsexual community considered that the failure to fight for
inclusion of the specific language amounted to outright
abandonment stemming from a political cost-benefit analysis.2'
In effect, the passage of statewide anti-gay discrimination law
actually served to create a schism in an otherwise fairly unified
community of minorities defined by sexual orientation or
identity.
Inconsistencies with regard to varying levels of legal
rights and recognition along geographic lines also threaten to
create divisions within the gay community and further
marginalize gays and lesbians who require the most protection.
When localities establish legal protections for the gay and
lesbian community, "gay ghettos" develop and thereby diminish
the perceived need for broad legal recognition beyond city
limits. Gays and lesbians are encouraged to cluster in certain
jurisdictions because of their gay-friendly laws and political
climates, while those in more obscure localities lack the
resources and political clout to advance their rights. For
example, of all lesbians and gay men in the United States,
45.1% and 52.7% live in urban areas, respectively, while 33.1%
and 31.7% live in the suburbs, respectively.2  If New York
demographics follow this pattern, then approximately one in
five gay and lesbian people resides outside of the localities most
likely to establish progressive ordinances.2 " As a consequence,
gay rights become urban rights rather than civil or human
rights. Civil rights should not be contingent on where a person
chooses to live, yet this is precisely the position in which gays
and lesbians find themselves in New York under the purely
incremental approach.
Although the incremental approach certainly is
burdened by legal limitations and political drawbacks, it might
well sow the seeds for future widespread action advancing gay
and lesbian civil rights in New York. For example, many
supporters of the incremental approach suggest that SONDA's
2,0 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
2" See Dewan, supra note 34.
2 There is a clear correlation between the density of the gay and lesbian
population in a particular jurisdiction and the number of legal protections afforded the
community. See THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 298-99 (Craig A. Rimmerman et al eds.,
2000).
21, See GAY AND LESBIAN STATS: A POCKET GUIDE OF FACTS AND FIGURES
(Bennett L. Singer & David Deschamps eds., 1994).
2, See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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passage was due in large part to increasing numbers of
localities passing anti-discrimination statutes of their own.
Because of growing local support for gay civil rights, many
state legislators determined that a vote for SONDA would not
translate into a political liability in future reelection
campaigns.2 5 Furthermore, SONDA might well pave the way
for the Court of Appeals to apply a heightened standard of
scrutiny to same-sex challenges of state marriage."' Viewed in
the most favorable light, incrementalism might ultimately
provide the raw materials for more substantive civil rights
developments in New York State.
Recent developments in the national gay and lesbian
civil rights landscape further suggest that incrementalism is
indeed capable of providing the raw materials for broader
social, political, and legal change. Most notably, the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence recognized that recent
developments among the states pertaining to same-sex
relationships warranted reconsideration of discriminatory
practices against gays and lesbians."7 Further, the Court went
on to note that the doctrine of stare decisis did not weigh
against overruling Bowers because there was no substantial
individual or societal reliance on its holding."' Although the
Court certainly did not ground its decision in Lawrence on legal
and social changes among the various states,"' the Court's
reasoning does suggest a certain degree of cognizance of
incremental advances and lends support to the argument that
small steps can lead the way to broader change.
Although incremental gains arguably laid some of the
groundwork for overruling Bowers, it is the actual Lawrence
decision that serves to coalesce those gains into meaningful
215 Press Release, Empire State Pride Agenda, New York Outlaws Anti-Gay
Discrimination: Bi-Partisan State Senate Vote Breaks 31-Year Impasse, available at
http:llwww.prideagenda.org/pressreleases/pr-12-17-02.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2004).
216 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. See also Baker v. State of
Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 885 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the history of discrimination based
on sexual orientation prompted heightened scrutiny in a state equal protection
challenge of Vermont marriage law, and thereby mandating rights be afforded same-
sex couples on an equal basis with traditional married couples pursuant to the creation
of alternate statutory scheme).
217 In overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court noted
that "the 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in the Bowers
decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual
conduct." Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003).
218 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
219 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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progress and provides the momentum for even more
widespread advances. Within months of the Court's decision,
the tremendous impact of Lawrence became clear when the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the denial
of civil marriage to individuals of the same sex lacked a
rational basis and violated state constitutional equal protection
principles.22° In Goodridge v. Public Health, same-sex couples
that were denied marriage licenses filed an action for
declaratory judgment against the Department and
Commissioner of Public Health, alleging that the department
policy and practice of denying marriage licenses to same-sex
couples violated a number of provisions of the Massachusetts
state constitution. 22' Although the decision was based on state
constitutional principles, the Supreme Judicial Court relied on
Lawrence to support the proposition that the denial of civil
marriage infringed on personal autonomy, intruded on
expressions of intimacy and ultimately violated basic principles
of equality. 22 It was with these principles at the fore that the
Supreme Judicial Court ordered the state legislature to open
the doors of civil marriage to same-sex couples.23
Coupled with Lawrence, the Goodridge decision set off a
firestorm of activity among both supporters and opponents of
gay rights, particularly with regard to same-sex relationship
recognition. 4 Armed with two key court rulings, municipalities
returned to the forefront of the battle by issuing marriage
licenses to thousands of same same-sex couples that resulted in
thousands of same-sex marriages."s Eventually, state courts
intervened to block the further issuance of marriage licenses,
setting the stage for full-fledged court battles over the legality
of prohibitions on same-sex marriages.226 Meanwhile, an
220 Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
221 Id. at 949-50.
222 Id. at 948-49.
221 Id. at 969-70.
224 Carolyn Lochhead, Same-Sex Marriage Momentum Stuns Both Its Backers
and Foes, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 5, 2004, at A19.
225 San Francisco, California (3,955 marriages); Multnomah County, Oregon
(3,000 marriages); Sandoval County, New Mexico, (66 marriages); New Paltz, New
York (21 marriages); Asbury Park, New Jersey (1 marriage). Human Rights Campaign
Foundation, Statistics: Number of Same-Sex Couples Married (2004), at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=17420&TEMPLATE
=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm.
226 Bog Egelko, Court Halts Gay Vows/Surprise Ruling: Newson Says the City
Will Make a Strong Case, State Justices Take S.F. Case on Narrow Constitutional
Issue, Promise Quick Decision, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 12, 2004, at Al.
1198 [Vol. 69:3
20041 INCREMENTALISM AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAW 1199
apparent backlash against gay rights emerged as opponents of
gay marriage renewed their efforts to secure state and federal
constitutional amendments prohibiting gay marriage. 7 Based
solely on the events triggered in large part by the Lawrence
decision, it is quite clear that the stakes could not be any
higher for the gay rights movement or its opponents.
Despite these high stakes, gay rights advocates in New
York State and elsewhere should avoid focusing on a strategy
of pure incrementalism and the sense of relative security and
stability it provides. It is a false sense of security and stability.
If history is any guide in New York,"8 a purely incremental
strategy will not resolve the problems gays and lesbians face
with regard to intestacy, standing in tort actions, or parental
rights within a reasonable timeframe.229 On the federal level,
there is similarly little hope that a purely incremental strategy
could level the playing field for same-sex partners with regard
to the 1,049 federal laws in the United States Code in which
marital status is a factor."' A purely piecemeal incremental
approach will largely maintain rather than dismantle the
instability inherent in the current patchwork of rights and
privileges afforded same-sex partners. On the other hand, a
broad judicial holding requiring equal access to civil marriage
or the equivalent could remedy these problems in one fell
swoop just as Lawrence did away with the criminalization of
certain forms of intimacy and the resulting collateral
consequences.2 "' Although direct challenges of discriminatory
practices run the risk of energizing opponents of equal rights,
the risks were certainly worth taking in Lawrence and will be
worth taking again. In the end, advocates of equal rights must
remember that gays and lesbians rarely, if ever, achieve
personal or legal progress by muzzling their voices in an effort
to avoid social and political discord.
227 Carolyn Lochhead, Big Fights Rage in State Capitols; Foes, Proponents of
Ban Working Overtime, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 11, 2004, at Al.
228 See discussion supra Part III.B.
22 See discussion supra Part V.C.4-6.
230 Letter from Barry R. Bedrick, Associate General Counsel, United States
General Accounting Office, to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives (Jan. 31, 1997), available at
http://www.marriageequalityny.org.
231 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Even if it appears that there are avenues to capitalize
on the incremental approach to securing civil rights for the gay
community, history shows that these avenues evolve slowly
and are difficult to navigate. The risks associated with
pursuing an aggressive strategy that presses the controversial
and difficult issues affecting the gay and lesbian community
should not be overlooked, but they should not dictate the
overall strategy employed by the movement. Instead, the
increasingly intense public discourse on sexual orientation and
the looming constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex
marriage should suggest that gay rights have finally made
their way onto the national agenda and settled into the
national consciousness. Rather than backing away from the
national debate by quietly taking cover and exclusively
pressing for equality in local city halls, the gay rights
movement should utilize incremental strategies to primarily
create the building blocks that support and compliment legal
action that achieves large-scale reform. As Lawrence v. Texas
aptly demonstrates, incremental change makes progress
possible, but only by pressing the fundamental questions will
progress and equality become the reality for gays and lesbians
in New York and throughout the United States. Until these
fundamental questions are pressed, the gay and lesbian
community will be forced to live under the patchwork of rights
created by legislative incrementalism and current sexual
orientation jurisprudence. As long as the composition remains
structurally unsound, the gay community must remain
cognizant of the inherent limitations of a patchwork design as
it continues to struggle towards equality in New York State
and beyond.
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